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M O R I T Z S C H L I C K O N S E L F - E V I D E N C E 
The problem of self-evidence, the question whether there are any 
instances of it and what epistemological value attaches to them, is one 
that has dogged the footsteps of modern philosophy from its beginning 
in Descartes up to the present day. The following consideration will 
show how important the problem is. Our conviction that a proposition is 
true is often supported by some form of substantiation, in the ideal case 
by a proof of the proposition. Not all propositions, however, can be 
substantiated. The substantiation or establishment of any proposition 
begins with premisses and proceeds by means of inferences to its final 
conclusions. If we are to accept the conclusion, we must be convinced 
of the truth of those premisses and the validity of those inferences. Thus 
no conviction can be a substantiated one unless there are convictions 
that do not come to us by means of substantiation but are thought to be 
in no need thereof. Substantiated beliefs depend upon unsubstantiated 
ones. The same holds for knowledge too. Val id modes of inference 
ensure that the truth of the premisses is inherited by the conclusions. 
Thus if our inference is correct and our original premisses true, then the 
proposition established by the inference is also true. But the truth of the 
original premisses is not mediated by inference. Mediated and sub-
stantiated knowledge can exist only where there is unsubstantiated 
knowledge. Since an infinite regress of substantiation is out of the 
question, we are left (so the usual argument runs) with the choice 
between a dogmatic or conventionalist position that declares certain 
propositions true without further justification and on the other hand, 
the assumption that certain propositions possess a self-evidence that 
guarantees their truth.1 
Against this position Schlick adduced the following argument: 
Now we do, of course, establish truth by means of various data of consciousness, and we 
may if We choose call these self-evidence. But it is impossible to sustain the doctrine that 
there is a peculiar irreducible experience of self-evidence, the presence of which 
constitutes a sufficient criterion and an unmistakable mark of truth. This is proved by the 
empirical fact that the experience of self-evidence occurs also in the case of notoriously 
false judgements. Any false claim that is defended with honest fervour may serve as an 
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example. Thus the systems of such great metaphysicians as Descartes and Spinoza consist 
in large measure of false judgements which their originators nevertheless held to be the 
most certain of all truths. I am aware that defenders of the doctrine of self-evidence 
maintain that in these instances what was experienced was not genuine self-evidence; they 
would have us believe that what was involved instead was a certainty "without 
self-evidence". This claim, however, is tangled up in a hopeless contradiction. On the one 
hand, if genuine self-evidence is experienced as essentially different from spurious (a 
certainty without self-evidence), then the two will never be confused with one another; 
there will be no mistakes about self-evidence - with the result that we shall have denied 
the existence of the very set of facts the theory was devised to explain. On the other hand, 
if there is no immediate difference between the two experiences, then we can decide only 
indirectly, by means of subsequent investigation, whether what is present is certainty with 
self-evidence or certainty without it. And this is an admission that a genuine criterion of 
truth is not to be found in an experience of self-evidence, but that the other criteria are 
decisive which have to be employed in connection with that subsequent investigation. 
Such criteria cannot themselves be experiences of self-evidence; otherwise we would be 
caught up in a circle. But then the claim that self-evidence is the ultimate criterion becomes 
untenable. Thus each alternative leads to a contradiction with the presuppositions of the 
theory.2 
Schlick's argument has been criticized by W. Stegmüller. "Against this 
apparently cogent reasoning", he writes, "our only objection must be 
its contradictoriness. For its claim is to have rendered self-evident (and 
clearly no pseudo-self-evidence is intended at this point) that there is no 
"objective" self-evidence distinguishable from pseudo-self-evidence. 
How then are we to know that all our reasoning against self-evidence is 
not pseudo-reasoning, since in its very course we have been the victims 
of pseudo-self-evidence?"3 
Stegmüller, for his part, maintains that the problem of self-evidence 
is an insoluble one. Any argument for the existence of (genuine) 
self-evidence and equally any argument against it, must presuppose the 
(genuine) self-evidence of its own premisses and modes of inference, 
thus leading in the one case to a petitio principa and in the other to a 
self-contradiction. 4 
Our aim is to show, contrary to this view, that Schlick's argument, 
once it has been reconstructed in a fairly obvious way, is completely 
correct. T o be sure, Schlick provoked criticism such as Stegmüller's by 
dispensing with precise conceptual distinctions, and by making such 
statements as, "that the foundations of what we know are neither 
certain nor uncertain; they merely are. They are not something evident, 
nor need they be; they are independently, self-sufficiently there."5 
We begin with a number of distinctions. We call self-evident those 
states of affairs of whose subsistence we are convinced without relying 
on any substantiation; states of affairs, therefore, that are obvious to us 
without more ado. Statements about self-evidence have the form, "It is 
self-evident to person a (at time t) that the state of affairs p subsists." 
An instance of self-evidence, then, is either the state of affairs that 
something is self-evident to somebody or a state of affairs that is 
self-evident to somebody. 
On the normal understanding of "self-evident" the following prin-
ciple holds: 
I If it is self-evident to someone that p, then he is convinced 
that p. 
But the use of the word is such that the converse is not universally valid. 
Not all states of affairs of whose subsistence we are convinced are at the 
same time self-evident to us. For example, my belief is that Munich has 
about 1.3 million inhabitants, yet this is not self-evident to me, and I 
also rely on the entries in an encyclopaedia without having convinced 
myself of their correctness.6 
A further point is that there is no hidden self-evidence. It would be 
nonsense to assert that a state of affairs was self-evident to somebody 
but that he did not know that it was self-evident to him. But knowing 
implies being convinced; thus, in order not to add the problems of the 
concept of knowledge to those we have to deal with, we can take as a 
starting-point the following principle also: 
II If it is self-evident to someone that p, then he is also 
convinced that it is self-evident to him that p . 7 
Up to this point the matter is unproblematic. The real problem in the 
analysis of the word "self-evident" resides in the question whether to 
accept the meaning-postulate 
III* If it is self-evident to someone that p, then p is valid. 
That is, is self-evidence what we shall call reliable*? 
If it is now self-evident to me that p and if I later establish that p is 
false, ought I then to say, "It was self-evident to me that p, but p is 
false", or rather, "It only seemed to me to be self-evident that p, but it 
cannot in fact have been self-evident to me, since p is in reality false"? 
If "self-evident" is interpreted in the sense indicated by III* then we 
have to, at least in principle, distinguish between spurious self-evidence 
(a false conviction as to the occurrence of self-evidence) and genuine 
self-evidence (a true conviction as to the occurrence of self-evidence). 
By II it will follow that self-evidence and genuine self-evidence are 
simply the same thing. 
We thus face the question whether spurious self-evidence is possible. 
If this is to be excluded, we have to assume the principle: 
III If someone is convinced that it is self-evident to him that p, 
then it is in fact self-evident to him that p. 
Taken together with II this tells us that the occurrence of self-evidence 
{in one's own case) is problem free: One can never be deceived as to 
whether something is or is not self-evident to one. 
Taking into account these principles, which are all to be regarded as 
meaning-postulates and thus as analytic propositions, three inter-
pretations of the word "self-evident" can be distinguished, for all of 
which I and II hold. 
(1) III holds but III* does not. Self-evidence is thus problem 
free but not reliable and consequently is, like conviction, a 
purely subjective criterion of truth. 
(2) III* holds but not III. Self-evidence is thus reliable but not 
problem free. In that case self-evidence is an objective 
criterion of truth but one can be deceived as to its occur-
rence. 
(3) III and III* both hold. Self-evidence is thus both problem 
free and reliable, a criterion of truth both subjectively 
decidable and at the same time objective. 
For brevity's sake we shall give to self-evidence in senses (1), (2) and 
(3) respectively the names subjective, objective, and perfect self-evi-
dence. Interpretation (1) most nearly corresponds to the normal use of 
the word "self-evident", which is particularly marked by the charac-
teristic of being problem free. In the normal understanding of the word 
it would be nonsense to say, "I do not know whether the state of affairs 
p is self-evident to me": it is in line with this that such statements are 
contradictory according to III. This rules out interpretation (2). But 
what are we to say of interpretation (3)? The concept of perfect 
self-evidence is certainly not the normal concept of self-evidence. This 
can be seen simply from Schlick's observation, quoted above, that in 
the past self-evidence has frequently led to the formation of false 
judgements. In the sense of "self-evidence" which permits us to make 
this assertion, self-evidence is not perfect. In what follows, when we 
speak of "self-evidence" without further qualification, subjective self-
evidence will always be what is meant. For "self-evident in the 
objective sense" we shall also use the briefer designation "self-
evident*". 
States of affairs that are self-evident can subsist or not subsist. In the 
case that it is self-evident to someone that p, and p does subsist, we shall 
speak of correct self-evidence. It is then natural to define as follows: It is 
self-evident* to a person a that p just in case it is self-evident to a that p 
and p subsists. So interpreted the concept of "self-evidence*" satisfies 
principle III* but not principle III; furthermore correct self-evidence 
can be termed (genuine) self-evidence* and incorrect self-evidence 
specious self-evidence*.8 
Schlick's argument can now be reconstructed. His aim is to show that 
there are no instances of perfect self-evidence, no self-evidence 
whose occurrence constitutes "a sufficient criterion and infallible mark 
of truth". T o establish this, he points to the fact that there are instances 
of incorrect self-evidence. The remainder of his argument is addressed 
to the objection that all such cases are instances of merely spurious 
self-evidence. Schlick says that if the difference between genuine and 
spurious self-evidence were part of what was given us in the experience 
of self-evidence, then we should be able to see through the spuriousness 
immediately: it would therefore be impossible for us to be mistaken 
about the genuineness of an instance of self-evidence, with the con-
sequence that there would be no instances of spurious self-evidence. It 
results, therefore, that the distinction between genuine and spurious 
self-evidence on which the objection rests cannot be maintained. This 
part of the argument can also be put in the following way. The 
distinction between genuine and spurious cannot be made for any form 
of self-evidence that satisfies III; in particular, it cannot be made for 
perfect self-evidence. But, Schlick continues, no form of self-evidence 
that does not allow the immediate distinction between genuine and 
spurious can be a subjective criterion of truth. Our conviction that p was 
self-evident would require every bit as much justification as the 
conviction that p was valid, which the self-evidence of p was meant to 
justify. This can be put in another way. If III is abandoned, then in the 
first place there can no longer be any perfect self-evidence and in the 
second place no form of self-evidence can perform the task required of it, 
that namely of providing justification without substantiation. 
In effect Schlick's argument amounts to this: that, in the face of the 
fallibility of judgements arrived at through self-evidence we cannot 
have both reliability and freedom from problems. Self-evidence thus 
cannot be both a subjectively decidable and an objectively adequate 
criterion of truth. 
This argument is essentially correct, but with the reservation that 
from the statement (1) "There are judgements formed as a result of 
self-evidence but false" it only follows that the self-evidence in question 
is not generally reliable, i.e., is not perfect self-evidence. The state-
ment, "There are no instances of perfect self-evidence", on the other 
hand, is stronger. It asserts that there is no nonempty concept of 
perfect self-evidence. But this by no means follows from the fact that 
statement (1) is true, when "self-evidence" is taken in its normal sense. 
Perfect self-evidence certainly exists, but only within very narrow 
limits, e.g., as regards very elementary analytic or introspective pro-
positions, and not as regards any question touching the external world. 
If we regard the external world as independent of us, then there can be 
no analytic connexion between what is subjectively decidable (as 
self-evidence is according to III) and what is objective, though this is 
what III* demands. As Frege put it, " B y the step with which I win an 
environment for myself I expose myself to the risk of error." 9 
Stegmiiller's criticism of Schlick's argument does not hold good for 
the following reason. It does not have to be made self-evident* that 
there is no self-evidence* nor does Schlick need perfect self-evidence 
that there is no perfect self-evidence. Schlick neither disputes the 
existence of instances of correct self-evidence, nor does he claim 
perfect self-evidence for his argument. He only wants to show - i.e., to 
make correctly self-evident (in our interpretation to make self-
evident*) that there are no instances of perfect self-evidence. 
Stegmiiller's undecidability argument is also untenable. That some 
things are self-evident is itself self-evident, but it requires no sub-
stantiation. No, it is self-evident to anyone to whom anything has ever 
been self-evident. It is, by principle I, likewise self-evident that there are 
instances of correct self-evidence. This too needs no substantiation, for 
self-evidence invariably carries with it conviction of truth. On the other 
hand, no immediate self-evidence can be claimed for the very strong 
generalized statements "There are no instances of self-evidence" and 
"There are no instances of correct self-evidence", while the statement, 
"It is self-evident to me that there are no instances of (correct) 
self-evidence" would be, as Stegmüller justly stresses, paradoxical. 
There can thus be no talk of undecidability as regards the problem of 
self-evidence. T o be sure, we ourselves have put forward arguments; 
but we have not sought to substantiate the assertion that there are 
instances of self-evidence - that assertion has never been seriously 
contested so far as subjective self-evidence is concerned: what we 
have done is to talk about meaning postulates for the word "self-
evidence" and about the consequences of these postulates. In so doing 
we have been able to assume self-evidence for our premisses and 
conclusions without being guilty of petitio principii. It is a truth beyond 
doubt that if nothing is self-evident to a man - not even this fact itself or 
the sense of his own statements - then there is no foisting self-evidence 
on him by proof. With such people, however, supposing they existed, 
there would be no possibility of rational discussion. Certainly no one 
who has written on the problem of self-evidence has been among their 
number, because there can be no honest assertion unless the speaker is 
convinced of its truth, but without immediate convictions (i.e., con-
victions attended by self-evidence) there cannot be any mediated 
convictions either, nor, hence, any convictions at all. 
Stegmüller also goes wrong when he speaks of our deciding to 
recognize self-evidence or to acknowledge its validity. Self-evidence is 
a subjective criterion of truth. Anyone to whom something is self-
evident is, by principle I, also convinced of its truth. Self-evidence 
leaves no more room for decision than conviction does. It is nonsense to 
say "I am convinced that p holds but may not decide to regard p as 
true" and equally nonsense to say, "It is self-evident to me that p holds 
but I may not decide to regard p as true." 
But where does this leave the argument with which we began - that 
since all substantiation comes to an end somewhere, our claims to know 
anything rest either on dogmatic presuppositions that cannot be 
justified or on self-evidence which guarantees truth? As we have seen, 
perfect self-evidence exists, if at all, in very restricted and uninteresting 
areas. Of the two alternatives we seem to be reduced to that of 
dogmatism. This unwelcome conclusion is, however, by no means 
compelling. Perfect self-evidence is required only for the justification of 
perfect knowledge, i.e., of knowledge for which it holds that if someone 
is convinced that he knows that p, then he does indeed know that p: 
suppositions about one's own knowledge would thus be infallible. Here 
too a similar principle applies. The normal concept of knowledge is not 
that of perfect knowledge. 1 0 What is true, using "knowledge" in the 
normal sense, is that if we are convinced that a state of affairs p subsists, 
then we are also convinced that we know that p holds. Conviction is the 
strongest subjective criterion of truth: surer than sure of a thing we 
cannot be. By principle I, we shall in consequence be convinced of the 
subsistence of a state of affairs, once that subsistence is self-evident to 
us. Thus we have no need to ask for more than (subjective) self-
evidence regarding the premisses and argumentation of an instance of 
substantiation: that is enough for us to be convinced of the truth of the 
conclusion. To be sure, convictions are not always right; but then there 
cannot be a subjective guarantee of the truth of synthetic propositions 
when their holding good is independent of all opinions on the part of the 
subject in question. 
NOTES 
1 Self-evidence primarily attaches to propositions and states of affairs. Sentences can he 
(and Sätze are in the original German of this article) so called when the propositions that 
they express are self-evident. 
2 Schlick, G T K , pp. 148-9. 
3 Stegmüller (69), 180. 
4 See Stegmüller (69), 168ff. 
5 Schlick, GTK, p. 148. 
6 This is why the equation of ''merely subjective" self-evidence with certainty (in the 
sense of conviction) that is found in both Schlick and Stegmüller cannot be defended. 
7 If "knowledge" is understood in the sense of true conviction, as argued in Kutschera 
(81), 1.3 and 1.4, then II is equivalent to the principle "Self-evidence implies knowledge 
of self-evidence." 
H It holds by the definition that: "It is self-evident to someone that p just in case he 
believes that it is self-evident* to him that p." From this our assertion follows. If, on the 
other hand, the definition is not accepted, then a distinction must be drawn between correct 
self-evidence and self-evidence* and also between incorrect self-evidence and spurious 
self-evidence*. 
9 Frege, LI, p. 24. 
1 0 See Kutschera (81), ch. 1. 
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